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International Strategies in Fragile
States: Expanding the Toolbox?
Summary
In recent years, international actors have taken significant strides in attempting to
develop strategies and instruments that effectively address the problem of weak
and failing states. On the one hand, the intensified focus on state failure has to do
with general, fundamental shifts in the international security environment since
the end of the Cold War. On the other hand, however, the sharpened concern with
fragile states arises from the specific challenges, experiences, and interests of key
international actors – particularly the United Nations, the United States, and the
European Union.
This paper provides a brief overview of current efforts to improve and expand the
“toolbox” of state-building instruments and strategies. These include (a) the re-
finement of existing instruments through greater policy coherence in the fields of
conflict prevention, post-conflict reconstruction, and development assistance, as
well as (b) theoretical elaborations and practical advances regarding a set of more
innovative, targeted, and sometimes controversial strategies, including “shared”or
“conditional” sovereignty, “security first” approaches, the potential recognition of
new states, and regional solutions.
While constructive steps have been taken to improve strategies and policies direct-
ed toward fragile states, it is not clear how long the international community and
its publics will be willing to bear the material and human costs of long-term, com-
prehensive post-conflict reconstruction projects and “big pushes”in foreign aid. As
a result, more targeted instruments deserve closer consideration from policy-
makers seeking to make good policy decisions with scarce resources. Regardless of
whether the selected instruments are comprehensive or targeted in nature, the way
forward must be characterized by enhanced coordination and coherence among
national, regional, and international actors.
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1. Introduction
In recent years, international actors have taken significant strides in attempting to
develop strategies and instruments that effectively address the problem of weak
and failing states. The policy dynamism behind the issue of state failure is reflect-
ed in the prominent position given this topic in such key security documents as the
U.S. National Security Strategy, the European Security Strategy, and numerous
U.N. reports including the Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges
and Change as well as Kofi Annan’s own In Larger Freedom: Towards Security,
Development and Human Rights for All.1
On the one hand, the intensified focus on state failure has to do with general, fun-
damental shifts in the international security environment since the end of the Cold
War, including (a) the predominance of intra-state conflicts over inter-state wars,
(b) increased demand for international involvement in conflict prevention, peace-
keeping, and post-conflict reconstruction operations, and (c) the multiple humani-
tarian and security risks that emanate from failing states. The attacks of September
11, 2001 represent the critical turning point that linked the problem of state failure
with issues of international security, as a failed state – Afghanistan – provided safe
harbor for the preparation of catastrophic terrorist acts. Fragile states are now 
viewed as a breeding ground for the main international threats of the 21st centu-
ry, including terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, migration
and population displacement, pandemic diseases, and organized crime.
On the other hand, however, the sharpened concern with fragile states arises from
the specific challenges, experiences, and interests of key international actors in
recent years:
– For the United Nations, foreign policy debacles surrounding the former Yugo-
slavia, Rwanda, Sudan, and Iraq have forced a reassessment of U.N. security
policy and stimulated reform efforts in the areas of humanitarian intervention,
peacekeeping, and post-conflict reconstruction.
– For the United States, policy failures in Afghanistan and especially Iraq have led
to a fundamental reappraisal of how to plan and conduct nation-building and
post-conflict stabilization operations.
– For the European Union, the ineffectual initial response to violent conflicts in the
former Yugoslavia, together with the EU’s self-declared ambition to develop an
effective Common Foreign and Security Policy and European Security and
Defense Policy, have driven efforts to strengthen both civilian and military
peacekeeping and peacebuilding capacities.
All of the above factors have underscored the urgency of improving international
policies that seek to address the problem of fragile states. This paper provides a
brief overview of current efforts to improve and expand the “toolbox”of state-buil-
ding instruments and strategies. These include both (a) the refinement of existing,
“standard” instruments as well as (b) theoretical elaborations and practical ad-
vances regarding a set of more innovative, differentiated, and sometimes
controversial strategies.
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2. Coordination and Coherence: Refining Standard State-building
Instruments
The existing repertoire of state-building instruments and strategies employed by
international actors includes diplomacy and dialogue, development and trade poli-
cy, and conflict-related operations (covering the spectrum of conflict prevention,
peacekeeping, and post-conflict reconstruction). As individual countries, regional
organizations, and international institutions have gained experience in the multi-
faceted tasks of state-building and attempted to institutionalize lessons learned,
the most significant progress has occurred within two of these areas: conflict-
related operations and development assistance.
2.1. Conflict Prevention and Post-conflict Reconstruction
This broad policy field encompasses the entire range of instruments and strategies
to promote peace and security, effective governance, and socioeconomic develop-
ment in states where there is a high potential for violent conflict, or that are re-
covering from conflict situations.2 While international responses to conflict seek to
address both pre- and post-conflict situations, up to now the international com-
munity has clearly directed the bulk of its resources toward post-conflict recon-
struction (which is increasingly referred to within UN circles as “post-conflict
peacebuilding”and within the US policymaking establishment as “stabilization and
reconstruction”).
The end of the Cold War signified a fundamental shift in the orchestration of inter-
national security. Violent conflicts erupted in numerous weak new states in the
post-socialist European landscape, and numerous Third World proxy regimes
imploded as superpower sponsors cut off their artificial life support. As a result,
intrastate and regional conflagrations supplanted interstate wars as the primary
forms of international conflict. At the same time, international institutions – parti-
cularly the United Nations – were no longer polarized and paralyzed by the power
struggles that had created nearly insuperable obstacles to multilateral action
during the Cold War. Demand for multilateral intervention in conflict-affected states
and regions increased significantly, and international actors – both military and
civilian, state and non-state – found themselves engaged in peace negotiations,
peacekeeping operations, and post-conflict reconstruction activities in nearly every
part of the world, including Africa, Southeastern Europe, Central America, and
Southeast Asia.
The results of the international community’s increasing engagement in peace-
keeping, post-conflict reconstruction and state-building efforts have been mixed at
best. Some interventions have been partial successes (e.g., East Timor, Sierra Leone,
former Yugoslavia), some have been downright failures (Somalia), and in some 
critical cases (notably Rwanda and Sudan), multilateral institutions have become
involved too late or not at all. Furthermore, although international military and
civilian actors have been on a fast and steep learning curve, important lessons
learned have either not been adequately institutionalized or have been disregard-
ed entirely as largely ad hoc operations continually reinvent the post-conflict
reconstruction wheel (this has been most evident in U.S.-led engagements in
Afghanistan and especially Iraq). The accumulated costs of these partial successes,
undetermined outcomes, outright failures, and unincorporated lessons learned
Promoting coherence in 
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have become too high – in terms of financial outlays, unnecessary lives lost, fading
political will, and international legitimacy.
In the past few years, however, key international actors have undertaken a remar-
kable number of institutional innovations in an attempt to address the problem of
state failure with greater coherence. These innovations focus primarily on improv-
ing civilian-military and interdepartmental coordination in the planning and
implementation of conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction operations.
The following paragraphs provide an overview of the most prominent examples.
In the United Nations:
– One of the few concrete accomplishments of the United Nations World Summit
in September 2005 was the decision to create a Peacebuilding Commission.
Guided by “the need for a coordinated, coherent and integrated approach to
post-conflict peacebuilding,”3 the Commission will be an intergovernmental
advisory body whose goal will be to bring together relevant actors (local,
national, and international) and resources in order to implement better inte-
grated strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery processes in
countries emerging from violent conflict. Other objectives include serving as a
central point for the identification and institutionalization of best practices and
ensuring sustained international attention to countries undergoing transitions
from post-conflict recovery to long-term economic and political development.
The Peacebuilding Commission was approved by the Security Council and the
General Assembly in December 2005 and will be funded through a multi-year,
voluntary Peacebuilding Fund.
In European Union institutions:
While still saddled with internal structural problems that at times hinder effective
policy planning and implementation, the EU has played a clear leadership role in
establishing institutions that enable a more coherent response to international
security risks, including the security problems associated with state weakness and
failure.4 These institutions are embedded within the framework of the EU’s
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and European Security and Defense
Policy (ESDP).
– Within the Commission, the Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management Unit
was established in 2001 as part of DG External Relations with the purpose of
coordinating the Commission’s conflict prevention activities, integrating con-
flict prevention into the programming of EU foreign aid, overseeing a Rapid
Reaction Mechanism that provides quick and flexible funding in urgent pre-
and post-conflict situations, and maintaining contact with key international
actors such as the United Nations, the OECD, the Council of Europe, the OSCE,
and international financial institutions.
– Within the Council, a number of bodies and committees serve important func-
tions in (a) coordinating civilian conflict prevention and post-conflict recon-
struction efforts, (b) strengthening civil-military cooperation, and (c) providing
forums for consultation and coordination among EU member states. Some of
these bodies include: the Political and Security Committee, the Policy Planning
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and Early Warning Unit, the Joint Situation Centre (SITCEN), the Directorate-
General for Civilian Crisis Management and Coordination, the Civil-Military
Cell within the EU Military Staff, and the Committee for Civilian Aspects of
Crisis Management (CIVCOM). Moreover, the objectives elaborated in the 2010
Headline Goal and 2008 Civilian Headline Goal (both within the framework of
ESDP) are guided by the priorities of developing modular, multifunctional cri-
sis response capabilities, reinforcing civil-military cooperation, and enhancing
interoperability among the civilian and defense capabilities of member states.
– Finally, although its future is in serious jeopardy, the Constitutional Treaty con-
tains important innovations that would foster coherence within EU foreign and
security policy. These include the establishment of a European Foreign Minister
and a European diplomatic corps as well as the introduction of “permanent
structured cooperation,”a means by which smaller groups of member states can
choose to push forward with integration in the field of defense policy. Even if
the Constitution is ultimately never ratified, most of the key innovations it con-
tains in the fields of CFSP and ESDP can be implemented through treaty
amendments and interinstitutional agreements.5
In the United Kingdom:
– The U.K. has pioneered an interministerial pooling approach – also known as
“joined-up government” – in the field of conflict management. The central
achievement of this approach has been the establishment of the Global Conflict
Prevention Pool6 and the Africa Conflict Prevention Pool7 in 2001. These
Conflict Prevention Pools integrate the expertise of the Department for
International Development (DFID), the Ministry of Defense (MoD), and the
Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and provide pooled funding for joint
initiatives to promote security, development, and good governance in states
threatened or affected by violent conflict.
– Based upon the model established by the joined-up approach, a Post-conflict
Reconstruction Unit (PCRU) was established in September 2004 and should be
fully operational, with an interdepartmental staff of approximately 40, by mid-
2006.8 The PCRU is tasked with (a) improving civilian-military links in planning
and implementing post-conflict reconstruction policies and (b) strengthening
coordination between the U.K. and other international actors. The PCRU incor-
porates experts from DFID, MoD and FCO, and will also involve the creation of
a ministerial sub-committee chaired by the Foreign Secretary.
In Germany:
– In May 2004, the German federal government passed the Action Plan on
“Civilian Crisis Prevention, Conflict Resolution, and Post-conflict
Peacebuilding,”which defines conflict-related foreign policy activities as cross-
departmental tasks.9 An interministerial steering group, comprised of represen-
tatives from all federal ministries and under the supervision of the Foreign
Office, was established in September 2004. The German government has also
sought to institutionalize the participation of civil society actors in governmen-
tal decision-making processes by creating a civilian advisory board to the inter-
ministerial steering group.
Developments in the U.S.
Promising but limited
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In the Netherlands:
– In 2004, the Dutch government introduced a Stability Fund that combines
resources from the development and foreign policy budgets to provide support
for specific conflict-related issues such as security sector reform, developing
peacekeeping capacities, and small arms control.10
In the United States:
– The Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization was established within the
Department of State in August 2004 to oversee interagency coordination of
civilian conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction capacities.11 A staff
of approximately 35 persons includes representatives from the Departments of
State and Defense, USAID, the CIA, and the military’s Joint Staff.
– In November 2005, the Department of Defense defined stability operations as
a “core U.S. military mission” that will be given priority comparable to combat
operations and integrated across all Pentagon activities.12 In addition, the U.S.
Army has converted some of its artillery and air defense units into military po-
lice and civil affairs units.
– Numerous bipartisan task forces and experts have argued that the U.S. govern-
ment must raise the profile of conflict prevention and post-conflict stabilization
within U.S. foreign and security policy by (a) appointing cabinet-, director-, or
deputy secretary-level officials specifically tasked with civilian-military and
interagency coordination in these areas, (b) substantially increasing budgetary
resources allocated to these tasks, and (c) improving cooperation with other
national governments, regional organizations, and international institutions.13
These are all auspicious developments that hold the potential for more integrated
and effective policymaking in the future. But they remain little more than promis-
ing first steps, as issues of financing, staffing, authority, and actual implementation
remain problematic in nearly all of these cases. For example, the U.S. Office of
Reconstruction and Stabilization was recently dealt a severe setback when the U.S.
Congress refused funding for a planned $100 million Conflict Response Fund pro-
posed by the Bush administration.14 In addition, the ORS remains underfunded
and understaffed, and ORS director Carlos Pascual recently left his post for a posi-
tion at a leading U.S. think tank.15 The German Action Plan remains largely that –
a plan with good intentions but very little supplemental funding and no dedicated
support staff. 16 Coherence in EU policymaking is impeded by the EU’s pillar struc-
ture, in which the Council (i.e., the member states) retains nearly exclusive author-
ity over European security and defense policy (including short-term peacekeeping
and stabilization operations), while European development and trade policy – i.e.,
policy fields that promote state- and institution-building over the mid- to long-
term – are largely the domain of the European Commission.17 In addition, EU of-
fices such as the Conflict Prevention Unit are notoriously short-staffed.18 Finally,
the clashing interests of various UN member states and departments may yet
render the Peacebuilding Commission an ineffectual talk shop.19
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2.2. Development Assistance
In 2005, the issue of development assistance surged to the top of the international
agenda. High-level commissions (the UN Millennium Project, the U.K. govern-
ment’s Commission on Africa), widely publicized international events and meet-
ings (the G-8 Gleneagles summit, the United Nations World Summit, worldwide
“Live 8” concerts), high-profile manifestos (Jeffrey Sachs’ The End of Poverty), and
the breakthrough decision by G-8 leaders to cancel the debt of 18 of the world’s
poorest countries focused the international spotlight on the multidimensional
problems of poor countries, which also form the bulk of the world’s weak and fail-
ing states. These forums have overwhelmingly served as platforms for asserting
that a massive increase in foreign aid is necessary to eliminate poverty, increase
human security, and place the world’s poorest populations on a path toward
sustainable development.
However, proponents of the “big push” have not been without their prominent
detractors. Numerous experts have argued that foreign aid causes more problems
than it solves: by overwhelming weak state institutions that are unable to absorb
assistance from a plethora of international donors; by providing financial assis-
tance to corrupt regimes that exploit foreign money for personal enrichment rath-
er than the pursuit of development-oriented policies; by distorting markets and
exchange rates and thereby undermining the competitiveness of local industries;
and by establishing an incentive structure that is not necessarily conducive to good
governance and the implementation of political and economic reforms. These crit-
ics also argue that donors themselves are a key part of the problem, because they
often pursue donor-driven agendas that fail to take the interests, needs, and
capacities of recipient countries into sufficient account, and because they fail to
coordinate their programs and priorities adequately with other donors.20
Despite disagreements over the desirability of a “big push” in foreign aid to im-
poverished countries, both sides of the debate generally concur that (a) development
policy must focus more squarely on the problem of state weakness and failure and
(b) development assistance must be characterized by greater coherence and coor-
dination, at both the national and international levels, in order to improve the
effectiveness of aid. As in the fields of conflict prevention and post-conflict recon-
struction, the drive toward greater coherence within development policy is reflect-
ed in important institutional innovations:
– In 2002, the World Bank established a task force on “Low Income Countries
Under Stress” (LICUS). The LICUS Initiative adheres to the principle that
“state-building is the central objective in fragile states, and that effective donor
programs require integrated approaches across the political-security-develop-
ment nexus.”21 As foreign aid becomes increasingly conditional upon recipient
countries’ implementation of economic and governance reforms, international
donors are likely to withdraw from precisely those states that need assistance
the most. In order to prevent particularly fragile states from becoming “aid
orphans,” a LICUS Trust Fund targets a limited number of key policy areas
including the strengthening of institutions; initiating basic economic, social and
governance reforms; building capacity for social service delivery; and sup-
porting domestic reformers. By cooperating with other international actors such
as the OECD, the UN, the EU, and bilateral donors, the initiative seeks to 
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promote donor harmonization and the development of joint assessments and
strategies while gearing donor policies and procedures to the constraints of low
capacity in fragile states.
– In a similar vein, the Fragile States Group within the OECD’s Development Co-
operation Directorate (DAC) focuses on donor coordination, the improvement
of aid effectiveness, and service delivery in states referred to as “difficult part-
nerships,”particularly those states emerging from violent conflict. Of particular
relevance here is the Group’s emphasis on policy coherence and whole-of-
government approaches, i.e., coordination among agencies and ministries ac-
tive in the policy fields of development, security, and governance. The OECD has
produced a set of draft Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile
States, which emphasize the necessity of joined-up action among political, eco-
nomic, security, and development actors at the local, national, regional, and
international level.22
– In November 2005, the European Union published a Joint Statement entitled
“The European Consensus on Development,”which underscores the EU’s com-
mitment to improving development policy coordination (a) within European
institutions, (b) between the EU and its member states, and (c) between the EU
and other international donors. The EU’s proposals for enhancing international
donor coordination and policy coherence include the establishment of shared
analysis frameworks, joint multi-annual programming, and the increased use of
multi-donor planning and implementation processes. Moreover, the statement
emphasizes the need for development policy to focus on the problem of state
fragility and conflict prevention, by providing support for governance reforms,
rule of law mechanisms, anti-corruption measures, and the establishment of
viable state institutions.23 In addition, individual EU member states – particu-
larly the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Sweden – have been at the
forefront of efforts to enhance development policy coherence and to link the
issues of state-building and development.24
– As part of its “transformational diplomacy” initiative launched in January 2006,
the United States announced a restructuring of the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID) with the objective of strengthening coor-
dination and alignment between U.S. foreign and development policy.
Innovations include the creation of a new Director of Foreign Assistance within
the State Department, who will double-hat as the lead administrator of USAID.
This shift aims to consolidate authority over the budgeting, planning, and
implementation of all State and USAID foreign aid programs – which were pre-
viously scattered throughout both departments, sometimes to redundant or
contradictory effect – within one office. The stated objective of these changes is
to promote “integration between development, diplomacy, democracy, and
security.”25
Clearly, the institutional and policy shifts discussed above do not indicate that all
of these international actors are pursuing identical strategic agendas. In addition,
the perceived desirability and efficacy of these changes have been the subject of
heated debate amongst state and non-state actors. What is important to note here,
however, is that these refinements to standard state-building instruments repre-
sent the growing realization within the international community that the lessons
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learned from past efforts must be more effectively institutionalized and that coor-
dination within and among national, regional, and international actors must be
improved, particularly with regard to analysis, decision-making, funding mecha-
nisms, and the planning and implementation of programs and strategies. In light
of experiences gathered in responding to fragile states during the past 15 years,
international security actors have recognized that effective state-building requires
much more than short-term military-led stabilization operations. In turn, develop-
ment actors have recognized that security and effective governance are essential
prerequisites for sustainable development. As a result, international actors are
placing increasing emphasis on policy coherence – in particular, policies that address
the nexus between security, development, and diplomacy – as an essential compo-
nent in the improvement of international responses to weak and failing states.
3. Beyond the Standard Toolbox
Despite this progress, numerous policymakers and experts continue to express
strong doubts as to whether comprehensive conflict prevention, post-conflict
reconstruction, and development assistance strategies can achieve the goals of sta-
bilizing fragile states and setting them on the path to long-term sustainable devel-
opment. Even relatively “successful” state-building efforts in states and territories
such as Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo remain plagued with political, economic,
social, and security problems, and critical analysts of development policy pointed-
ly ask why a “big push”should succeed now, when hundreds of billions of dollars
in foreign aid spent over the past five decades have been so spectacularly unable
to promote economic growth in developing countries, particularly in Africa.26
Stephen Krasner argues, for example, that “the policy tools that powerful and well-
governed states have available to ‘fix’ badly governed or collapsed states – princi-
pally governance assistance and transitional administration … – are inadequate. In
the future, better domestic governance in badly governed, failed, and occupied
polities will require the transcendence of accepted rules…”27 In addition, Marina
Ottaway and Stefan Mair assert that the international community simply does not
possess the material, financial, and human resources, not to mention the political
will, to mount a large number of simultaneous, comprehensive state-building ef-
forts that encompass the (re)construction of political, economic, and security struc-
tures (e.g., such as those being carried out in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Iraq).28 Such
comprehensive operations are likely to be feasible, if at all, only in small states. As
a result, certain scholars and policymakers have begun to suggest a number of less
conventional, more limited, and sometimes controversial instruments and strate-
gies to address the problem of fragile statehood. The following sections provide a
brief overview of the most prominent of these approaches.
3.1. “Shared” or “Conditional” Sovereignty
The concept of “shared”or “conditional”sovereignty involves the establishment of
alternative forms of governance in states that are unable or unwilling to fulfill their
responsibilities as states yet still maintain international sovereignty. This concept
has been most fully elaborated by Stephen Krasner, whose recent move from aca-
demia to direct the U.S. State Department’s Policy Planning Staff may indicate that
this idea is shifting more steadily from theory to practice.29
Long-term engagement
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The notion of shared or conditional sovereignty entails international involvement
in limited, targeted areas of policymaking within particular fragile states. Stated
briefly, this involves the creation of new institutional forms in which international
actors share authority with domestic officials over key policy areas within a target
state, with the objective of enabling these states to fulfill certain core functions.
Examples could include:
– Natural resources revenue management, whereby representatives from the inter-
national community monitor revenues from resources such as oil, natural gas,
diamonds, and timber to prevent corruption and to ensure the transparent
expenditure of these revenues in a manner that promotes development and
benefits society at large, e.g., through institutional development, infrastructure
projects, and the provision of public services such as health care and education.
– The maintenance of security, e.g., through the presence of monitors and trainers
who assist in capacity-building and the implementation of security sector
reform, police training, and combating organized crime.
– Oversight of judicial systems, e.g., by establishing courts that include a mixture of
local and international judges, in order to strengthen the rule of law and judi-
cial independence.
Ideally, these arrangements would entail long-term monitoring and support, as well
as sufficient enforcement authority, with no pressure for a short-term exit strategy.
The indefinite time frame of such operations might thereby counteract the problem
of short-term interventions in which political and economic spoilers simply wait for
the international community to leave the scene. In addition, the targeted nature of
these actions would require far less international commitment in terms of funding
and personnel, thereby easing the burden of generating political will.
Forms of shared sovereignty already are, or in some cases will likely soon be, in
practice. The clearest example will likely be in Kosovo, where the most likely out-
come of status talks is a form of “conditional independence”in which Kosovo gains
de jure sovereignty while international forces maintain security and international
observers monitor the protection of minority rights.30 An additional (albeit prob-
lematic) example of shared sovereignty is the Chad oil pipeline project. In 1998, the
World Bank conditioned its financial support for the construction of this pipeline
on the establishment of a revenue management program to ensure that the noto-
riously corrupt Chad government uses its oil income to promote poverty reduction.
Supported by an international advisory board, the revenue management frame-
work requires that the majority of oil revenues be spent on “priority sectors” such
as health, education, and infrastructure, and that 10% of proceeds from oil sales be
set aside in a fund for future generations.31 Finally, a recent International Crisis
Group analysis of state-building in post-conflict Liberia strongly argued that the
international community should assume responsibility for the management of
revenue from ports, airports, customs, and the export of timber and diamonds, in
order to promote transparency in revenue collection and to ensure that the govern-
ment transfers funds to ministries and local governments. According to ICG, inter-
national management of revenue collection in Liberia would (a) provide the state
with the financial resources necessary to pursue a development agenda, (b) make
politics less attractive for warlords (because political power would not mean easy
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access to money), (c) stimulate better governance through greater transparency,
and (d) allow a long-term international presence to pay for itself, since the in-
creased revenue accruing to state coffers would allow the Liberian government to
assume the expenses for the international mission.32
Shared or conditional sovereignty represents a promising potential tool for addres-
sing core state-building issues with a relatively limited commitment of financial
resources and personnel. Nevertheless, the concept is not without its problems.
For example, shared sovereignty regimes imposed forcibly from outside by the
international community would almost certainly suffer from a lack of legitimacy in
the host country. Ideally, therefore, such operations would be established upon the
invitation of a particular fragile state. Yet how realistic is it to expect weak – and
often corrupt – regimes to consent to a long-term, partial surrender of state sover-
eignty? One possible solution would be to make international assistance to a par-
ticular state conditional upon the establishment of a shared sovereignty arrange-
ment. In addition, major democracies could pass legislation requiring that natural
resources imported from particularly corrupt or fragile states be subject to an inter-
nationally monitored revenue management framework. Moreover, since the prob-
lem of state fragility is generally a regional phenomenon, shared sovereignty re-
gimes could gain legitimacy through the power of positive example. In other
words, if a shared sovereignty regime in one state in a troubled region proved 
successful in promoting security, good governance, and/or economic development,
populations in neighboring states could mobilize public pressure to induce their
governments to introduce similar arrangements.33
Finally, due to their limited and targeted nature, shared sovereignty regimes are
most likely an inadequate instrument for addressing the multifaceted problems of
states that have imploded due to violent conflict or institutional collapse. Rather,
such arrangements are more appropriate for weak states possessing sufficient sta-
bility, institutional capacity, and political will, or post-conflict states that have
made reasonable progress toward recovery.34
3.2. “Security First”
Another targeted approach toward the problem of fragile states picks up from the
point that a large number of states possess the potential for failure, and each of
these states is embedded within its own complex national and regional dynamic.
Consequently, it is infeasible for the international community to deploy compre-
hensive state-building projects that encompass the dimensions of security, gover-
nance, and socioeconomic development in all of these states; international actors
simply do not possess the financial means, human resources, political will, and
knowledge to accomplish such a monumental task. Some analysts have therefore
asked whether there is a “hierarchy of collective goods” that should be prioritized
when addressing fragile states, namely the fundamental prerequisites of security
and basic structures of the rule of law.35
The “security first” approach argues that, first and foremost, security and stability
must be established as the essential foundation for long-term development in frag-
ile states. Marina Ottaway and Stefan Mair assert that the most important aspect
of state failure is the breakdown of internal security and the inability of states to
exercise effective control over their territory and to exert a monopoly on the use of
Virtuous or vicious cycle?
New sovereign entities?
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force. Therefore, international interventions should focus more narrowly on restor-
ing the state’s capacity to perform these core tasks.36
Focusing on security as the primary task of state-building means that internation-
al actors would need to analyze and respond appropriately to the different types of
security challenges that confront fragile states. For example, if a particular state is
faced with military challenges involving armed insurgents, secessionist movements,
and/or cross-border attacks, the appropriate policy response would likely involve
external intervention in the form of peace enforcement and peacekeeping.37
In most instances, however, fragile states struggle with security challenges that
involve not military challenges but rather the breakdown of law and order,
organized crime, corruption, and a lack of police force capacity. The accompanying
vacuum of power is then filled by private security actors, violent gangs, youth mili-
tias, etc. In these cases, the necessary policy response involves security sector
reform, i.e., the restructuring and retraining of armed forces, police, and intelli-
gence services, and the strengthening of civilian oversight capacities.38
In fact, a modified form of the “security first”approach appears to be gaining trac-
tion in policy circles. The joined-up government strategies in the United Kingdom,
Germany, and the Netherlands, mentioned above, each place particular emphasis
on security sector reform in fragile states as a key prerequisite for state-building
and long-term development.Yet despite the common-sense, targeted approach of
“security first,”the concept leaves a critical question unanswered: Is the establish-
ment of basic security and stability sufficient to set a virtuous cycle of development
in motion, or will security itself remain precarious without visible progress toward
political and economic development?
3.3. Recognizing New States
The question of recognizing new sovereign states is one of the most controversial
subjects in the debate over potential solutions to the problem of state failure and
collapse. The issue is raised most frequently in connection with Africa, due to
(a) the largely arbitrary nature of borders inherited from the colonial period and
(b) the existence of many states that are either too small to be economically viable
or too large and ethnically diverse to be managed effectively by weak and/or 
corrupt governments. Discussions on the potential creation of new states –
particularly by granting sovereignty to substate entities – thus almost universally
refer to Somaliland, which has developed increasingly autonomous and effective
governing structures since the collapse of Somalia, or to other African countries
such as Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo. But this question affects
other regions as well, particularly the South Caucasus (where the territories of
Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia seek either independence or
fusion with other states) and the Western Balkans (Kosovo and Montenegro).
Those who oppose the recognition of new states generally rely on five different
arguments.39 First, such an act might create a precedent that could ignite an
uncontrollable process of claims to independence and self-determination on
behalf of countless ethnic, religious, and linguistic groups in almost every world
region. This process would almost certainly be accompanied by instability, violent
conflict, and mass movements of people that could easily have regional or global
spillover effects. Second, the construction of new nation-states and administrative
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apparatuses would likely be an extraordinarily costly effort in terms of financial
resources, personnel, and international assistance. Third, there are other institu-
tional solutions that stop short of creating new sovereign states, such as power-
sharing arrangements, decentralization, and federalism. Fourth, some analysts
argue – particularly with regard to Africa – that state-building processes in many
fragile states have been telescoped into a number of years or decades, whereas it
took European states centuries to solidify into their current form. Rather than
having their existence called into question, such fragile new states should be given
more time – and international economic and governance assistance – to consolidate
their statehood.40 Fifth, there is no assurance that the leaders of new state forma-
tions will be more inclined to pursue a development agenda and protect minority
rights, or that they will be any less self-interested and corrupt than the previous
central government. In fact, self-appointed leaders of independence movements
may very well fabricate and manipulate “national” identities as a way to reap the
benefits of the acquisition of statehood.
In contrast, analysts who support a more open debate on this controversial issue
mobilize a number of arguments favoring the possible recognition of new states.41
First, some substate entities possess greater legitimacy and institutional capacity,
and are far better at providing collective goods, than their respective central
governments. For example, Somaliland enjoys higher levels of investment, trade,
and human development than other regions in Somalia and has already adopted
key trappings of statehood including a constitution, government structures, elec-
tions, security forces, and its own currency.42 Second, without formal independence,
relatively efficient and stable substate entities are unable to benefit from the 
legitimacy that statehood brings, particularly with regard to representation in
international organizations, access to development assistance, and the ability to
establish legitimate security structures. As a result, their populations do not enjoy
the security, political, and socioeconomic benefits that would likely accrue from
formal statehood. Third, fears of a limitless chain reaction of demands for self-
determination and independence may be overstated. For example, the secession of
Eritrea from Ethiopia in 1993 did not lead to the further fragmentation of the
Ethiopian state, even though southern Ethiopia contains more than 40 nationali-
ties and the country’s administrative units are organized to some extent according
to ethnic identity. Fourth, the potential instability and violence that might be 
caused by the creation of new states must be weighed against the harm – in terms
of human rights abuses, poverty, disease, and death – that current state arrange-
ments inflict upon their populations on a daily basis. Finally, the realities on the
ground in numerous failing and failed states often require international actors to
circumvent incapacitated central government institutions and cooperate with local
and substate authorities in order to accomplish their peacebuilding and develop-
ment objectives. As a result, the international community already works closely
with substate entities in these states as a matter of operational necessity.
One possible solution to this discursive and political stalemate might be to apply
strict conditions, agreed upon under appropriate regulations in international law,
to the international recognition of any new states. Such conditions could include
the following:
– Changes in national borders must be agreed upon consensually by those states
that are directly affected.
Growing emphasis on
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– New states may be recognized only after they have proven their ability to fulfill
particular security, governance, and socioeconomic criteria over a specific period
of time.
– Newly recognized states must fulfill specific legal conditions, e.g., the guaran-
tee of minority rights and fair political representation.
– Where necessary, newly recognized states will remain subject to an ongoing
international presence in the form of security forces, an international monitor-
ing mission, and/or some type of shared/conditional sovereignty regime pos-
sessing clear mandates and enforcement authority.
To a great extent, international policymakers and experts have vigilantly avoided
the question of recognizing new states as a potential instrument for dealing with
state failure. Nevertheless, it is an issue that plays an important role in the securi-
ty dynamics of numerous world regions. Resolving the question of whether to
(a) consider granting sovereignty to certain new states under carefully stipulated
conditions or (b) promote alternative arrangements such as power-sharing,
decentralization, and federalism will be key to the settlement of numerous active
and frozen conflicts that pose important risks to regional and international securi-
ty. Putting the issue on the back burner will likely only exacerbate instability and
insecurity in the long run. International actors must at least engage in a more open
discussion of the feasibility and ramifications of various options – the outcome of
the Kosovo status talks may provide a timely stimulus to this debate.
3.4. Regional Solutions
Promoting regional solutions to the problem of weak and failing states is certain-
ly not a new idea. Nevertheless, it is a strategic option that has gained increasing
dynamism in recent years, due primarily to two factors. First, international actors
have become increasingly aware of the regional dimensions of state failure and the
fact that intrastate conflicts present significant threats to regional security and eco-
nomic growth.43 The most obvious examples here are the Great Lakes and Mano
River regions in Africa, the Western Balkans, and the North and South Caucasus.
Second, the United Nations simply does not possess the administrative, logistical,
financial, human, and military resources to respond effectively in every location
where its intervention and assistance is demanded. As a result, affected regions are
recognizing the need to take responsibility for promoting security and growth in
their own neighborhoods.
Regionally oriented strategies to deal with the problem of weak and failing states
can take on several dimensions. These include:
– Strengthening regional organizations to deal with regional security issues. The most
relevant examples here are international efforts to enhance the security capabil-
ities of the African Union (AU) and subregional African organizations such as
the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Southern
African Development Community (SADC). While these organizations remain
relatively weak, understaffed, and underfunded, they have increasingly adopted
policies and peer-review mechanisms that (a) promote regional conflict
management and peacekeeping efforts, (b) permit intervention in the internal
affairs of member states in order to protect vulnerable populations, and (c) seek
to strengthen democratic structures.44 The United Nations has made its support
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for regional security organizations increasingly explicit, as both the High-level
Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change as well as the resolution to establish
a UN Peacebuilding Commission emphasize “the need for sustained interna-
tional support for the efforts and capacity-building of regional and subregional
arrangements in carrying out post-conflict peacebuilding activities.”45 In addi-
tion, the European Union, the United States, and numerous additional bilateral
donors provide training and funding to strengthen the conflict management
and peacekeeping capacities of regional and subregional organizations, par-
ticularly in Africa.46
– Promoting regional economic cooperation and integration. Greater economic inte-
gration in regions affected by state fragility may represent an important tool for
enhancing the economic growth that is essential for successful state-building
processes. Economic integration can strengthen domestic and regional mar-
kets, promote free trade and infrastructural development, create pressure for
improved standards and better economic governance, and enhance regional
competitiveness on global markets. Such integration may provide incentives
that encourage economic actors in fragile states to shift their activities from
informal to formal markets. Economic growth and an expanded formal sector
would also increase state revenues necessary for the provision of public goods.
Recently established regional arrangements such as the New Partnership for
Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and the Central American Free Trade
Agreement (CAFTA) will provide important case studies for the potential of
economic integration in underdeveloped regions.
– Regional approaches in the provision of development assistance. Given the fact that
insecurity, poor governance, and economic underdevelopment are largely
regional phenomena with an enormous potential for spillover, it would make
sense for international donors and development agencies to place more
emphasis on funding projects and programs within a regional rather than bi-
lateral framework and thereby to promote security, good governance, and eco-
nomic development at a regional level.47 For example, the Dutch government has
established regional development assistance programs (in the Great Lakesregion,
the Horn of Africa, and the Western Balkans) that focus on the issues of conflict
management and post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction.48
– Establishing regional peacebuilding conferences. As an alternative or complement
to the more formalized structures of regional organizations, institutionalized
regional conferences represent an additional mechanism for promoting region-
wide approaches to peace and development. Past and current regional con-
ferences such as the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe and
the International Conference on Peace, Security, and Democracy in the Great
Lakes Region provide examples of institutionalized yet more loosely structured
forums for dialogue that can promote information-sharing, transparency, trust-
building, and the development of common principles and strategies. In regions
where the material and psychological ravages of violent conflict remain fresh
and processes of cooperation are still in their beginning stages, such confer-
ences can set a diplomatic process in motion that lays the ground for longer-
term cooperation. They should ideally include national and local leaders, inter-
national organizations and donors, and civil society actors and address regional
issues such as security sector reform, weapons proliferation, effective gover-
Key strategic and 
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nance, trade and development, minority rights, the distribution of natural
resources, and donor policy coherence. Such conferences should take place
with the explicit support of international and/or regional organizations such as
the United Nations and the African Union.49
4. Conclusion
Policymakers and scholars have become increasingly adept at describing the core
functions of states as well as the characteristics and consequences of state weak-
ness, failure, and collapse. However, while we may have a good grasp of the prob-
lem, we have been much less successful in finding answers to basic strategic and
institutional questions of how to deal effectively with the multifaceted problems
associated with fragile states. The central strategic questions include: Where should
the international community intervene, and when? What state-building instru-
ments work best, and is there a particular sequencing that must be adhered to? Is
there a “minimum” of stateness that can be established through targeted instru-
ments which enable a virtuous cycle of stability and development, or is state-
building possible only as a comprehensive, long-term mission? And, perhaps most
importantly, what level of “stateness”should international actors strive realistical-
ly to achieve: basic security and stability, the establishment of solid institutional
structures, or full-fledged liberal democracies? Crucial institutional questions in-
clude: What sorts of institutional structures, decision-making mechanisms, and
changes in international law are required to deploy state-building instruments
effectively? Does the issue of state-building require a much higher institutional
profile in order for policymaking to become more effective? In other words, do we
need cabinet- or ministerial-level departments specifically tasked with creating
interdepartmental strategies to address the problem of fragile states, so that there
are stronger mandates, greater financial resources, and above all a clearer delega-
tion of responsibility for developing and implementing policies that really work?
Some important steps can be taken by key international actors. First, the European
Union must push forward with the development of CFSP and ESDP and strength-
en those units tasked with civil-military conflict prevention and post-conflict
reconstruction. In addition, the coordination of foreign, security, and development
policy within European institutions as well as between European institutions and
individual member states must be improved. These efforts should feed into the for-
mulation of an EU strategy toward fragile states along the lines of the already
existing EU strategies against terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction. Second, the United States must continue to strengthen the civilian
component of its security capabilities, but these efforts must be accompanied by a
clear shift away from unilateralism toward greater cooperation with other regional
and international actors. Third, the United Nations and its constituent member
states must make every effort to ensure that the Peacebuilding Commission is not
rendered impotent by inadequate funding and internecine quarrels over mem-
bership and mandate. Finally, mechanisms for coordination among these leading
actors – as well as with other regional and subregional organizations, international
financial institutions, and non-state actors – must be improved. A central priority
here must be the strengthening of “jointness” in analysis and assessment, strategy
formulation and implementation, and the division of responsibilities. The recent
Multinational Experiment to enhance civil-military coordination in post-conflict
situations – encompassing seven countries and NATO, with the European Union
and the United Nations as observers – may represent a useful step in this direction.50
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Enhancing multi-level coordi-
nation and coherence
International actors possess limited financial, human, and material resources for
dealing with the dozens of fragile states throughout the world. Constructive steps
have been taken to improve policymaking in the fields of conflict prevention, post-
conflict reconstruction, and development assistance.Yet it is not clear how long the
international community and its publics will be willing to bear the costs of long-
term, comprehensive post-conflict reconstruction projects and repeated “big
pushes”in foreign aid. Several more targeted, differentiated instruments and strat-
egies for addressing the problem of state-building have been presented above.
While each of these approaches leaves key questions unanswered, they deserve
closer consideration and scrutiny from policymakers seeking to make good policy
decisions with scarce resources. At the very least, the way forward must be char-
acterized by enhanced coordination and coherence at the national, regional, and
international levels.
Notes
1) The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf); A Secure
Europe in a Better World – The European Security Strategy (ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf); A More
Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, Report of the Secretary-General’s High-level Panel on Threats,
Challenges and Change (http://www.un.org/secureworld); In Larger Freedom: Towards Security, Development
and Human Rights for All, Report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, September 2005
(http://www.un.org/largerfreedom/).
2) See, e.g., Robert C. Orr (ed.), Winning the Peace: An American Strategy for Post-Conflict Reconstruction
(Washington, D.C.: The CSIS Press, 2004).
3) Draft resolution submitted by the President of the General Assembly,“The Peacebuilding Commission,”
14 December 2005, http://daccess-ods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?Open&DS=A/60/L.40&Lang=E (down-
loaded 22 December 2005).
4) For a detailed overview of EU institutions with remits that include conflict prevention, conflict manage-
ment, and/or post-conflict reconstruction, see International Crisis Group,“EU Crisis Response Capability
Revisited,”Europe Report 160, 17 January 2005.
5) See, e.g., Franco Algieri, Thomas Bauer, and Klaus Brummer,“Options for the Further Development of
CFSP and ESDP without a European Constitution,”Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2005.
6) http://www.fco.gov.uk/Files/kfile/43896_Conflict%20Broc,0.pdf
7) http://www.fco.gov.uk/Files/kfile/ACPP%20Information%20Doc%20-%20final.pdf
8) http://www.postconflict.gov.uk
9) http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/www/en/aussenpolitik/friedenspolitik/ziv_km/aktionsplan_html
10) Dutch Directorate-General for International Cooperation,“Mutual Interests, Mutual Responsibilities:
Dutch Development Cooperation en route to 2015,” The Hague, 3 October 2003. Available under
http://www.minbuza.nl/default.asp?CMS_TCP=tcpAsset&id=683A05F9C3D647A59C222CE7BE9586C4X1
X49856X86 (downloaded 30 November 2005)
11) http://www.state.gov/s/crs; see also Stephen D. Krasner and Carlos Pascual,“Addressing State Failure,”
Foreign Affairs, July/August 2005, pp. 153-163.
12) “U.S. Directive Prioritizes Post-conflict Capability,”Washington Post, 1 December 2005.
13) See, e.g., In the Wake of War: Improving U.S. Post-conflict Capabilities, the 2005 report of an independent
task force sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations and led by former National Security Advisors
Samuel Berger and Brent Scowcroft (http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Post-Conflict_
Capabilities_final.pdf); Jeremy M. Weinstein, John Edward Porter, and Stuart E. Eizenstat, On the Brink:
Weak States and US National Security, Center for Global Development, June 2004 (http://www.cgdev.
org/doc/books/weakstates/Full_Report.pdf).
14) Pamela Hess,“Congress Rejects Post-war Planning Fund,”United Press International, 2 November 2005;
Max Boot, “We Should Pay to Plan for Nation-building,” Los Angeles Times, 16 November 2005; “A
Transformation at State?” Washington Post, 21 January 2006.
15) At the time of writing, the U.S. Congress has authorized the Department of Defense to transfer up to
$100 million from its budget to the ORS in the event of a post-conflict operation. See Condoleezza Rice,
“Transformational Diplomacy,” speech held at Georgetown University, 18 January 2006,
http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2006/59306.htm; Neil King Jr. and Greg Jaffe,“U.S. Sets New Mission for
Klotzle · International Strategies in Fragile States: Expanding the Toolbox?
C·A·P Policy Analysis · 1 · 2006 Page 21
Keeping the Peace,”Wall Street Journal, 3 January 2006.
16) See Tobias Debiel,“Wie weiter mit effektiver Krisenprävention? Der Aktionsplan der Bundesregierung
im Vergleich zu den britischen Conflict Prevention Pools,”Die Friedens-Warte 79:3-4 (2004), p. 295.
17) Saferworld/International Alert,“Developing an EU Strategy to Address Fragile States: Priorities for the
UK Presidency of the EU in 2005,”June 2005, p. 5.
18) International Crisis Group,“EU Crisis Response Capability Revisited,”p. 14.
19)  Thalif Deen,“U.N.’s Peacebuilding Commission Off to a Slow Start,” Inter Press Service News Agency, 13
February 2006.
20) Illuminating analyses include Nicolas van de Walle, Overcoming Stagnation in Aid-dependent Countries
(Washington, D.C.: Center for Global Development, 2005); Nancy Birdsall et al., “How to Help Poor
Countries,”Foreign Affairs 84:4 (July/August 2005); and Rajan Raghuram and Arvind Subramanian,“What
Undermines Aid’s Impact on Growth?”International Monetary Fund Working Paper 05/126, June 2005.
21) LICUS Overview, http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/PROJECTS/STRATEGIES/EXTLI-
CUS/0,,contentMDK:20176979~menuPK:511786~pagePK:64171531~piPK:64171507~theSitePK:511778,0
0.html (downloaded 6 December 2005).
22) OECD Fragile States Group: http://www.oecd.org/department/0,2688,en_2649_33693550_1_1_1_1_1
,00.html; OECD whole of government approaches: http://www.oecd.org/document/4/0,2340,en_2649_
33693550_35237252_1_1_1_1,00.html
23) Joint Statement by the Council and the representatives of the Governments of the Member States
meeting within the Council, the European Parliament and the Commission on European Union
Development Policy, “The European Consensus on Development,” Document 14820/05 DEVGEN 229
RELEX 678 ACP 155, 22 November 2005.
24) See, e.g., Department for International Development, “Why We Need to Work More Effectively in
Fragile States,” January 2005, http://www.dfid.gov.uk/pubs/files/fragilestates-paper.pdf; Department for
International Development, “Fighting Poverty to Build a Safer World: A Strategy for Security and
Development,” March 2005, http://www.dfid.gov.uk/pubs/files/securityforall.pdf; Dutch Directorate
General for International Cooperation, “Mutual Interests, Mutual Responsibilities: Dutch Development
Cooperation en route to 2015,” October 2003; Government Offices of Sweden, “Shared Responsibility:
Sweden’s Policy for Global Development,” May 2003, http://www.sweden.gov.se/download/c4527821.pdf
?major=1&minor=24520&cn=attachmentPublDuplicator_0_attachment; Owen Barder, “Reforming
Development Assistance: Lessons from the UK Experience,” Center for Global Development, Working
Paper 70, October 2005.
25) Condoleezza Rice, Remarks on Foreign Assistance, U.S. Department of State, 19 January 2006,
http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2006/59408.htm; Bradley Graham and Glenn Kessler,“Rice Explains Aid
Restructuring to USAID Employees,”Washington Post, 20 January 2006.
26) In addition to the literature cited in Note 14 above, see also William Easterly,“The Utopian Nightmare,”
Foreign Policy, September/October 2005, pp. 58-64.
27) Stephen Krasner,“Sharing Sovereignty: New Institutions for Collapsed and Failing States,”International
Security 29:2 (Fall 2004), p. 85.
28) Marina Ottaway and Stefan Mair, “States at Risk and Failed States: Putting Security First,” Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace/Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Policy Outlook, September 2004.
29) See Stephen D. Krasner, “Sharing Sovereignty: New Institutions for Collapsed and Failing States,”
International Security 29:2 (Fall 2004), pp. 85-120. Other useful analyses along these lines include James D.
Fearon and David D. Laitin,“Neotrusteeship and the Problem of Weak States,” International Security 28:4
(Spring 2004), pp. 5-43, as well as the pathbreaking argument in Gerald B. Helman and Steven R. Ratner,
“Saving Failed States,”Foreign Policy 89 (Winter 1993), pp. 3-20.
30) See, e.g., Daniel Williams, “In Kosovo, Two Peoples Look Across Bitter Divide,” Washington Post, 22
November 2005; Ewen MacAskill,“Serbs Accuse UN of Violation of Law over Kosovo Independence,”The
Guardian, 25 October 2005; Filip Slavkovic,“Kosovo vor den Statusgesprächen,”Deutsche Welle, 25 October
2005; International Crisis Group,“Kosovo: Toward Final Status,”Europe Report No. 161, 24 January 2005.
31) It should be noted that Chad’s revenue management program has been subject to considerable criti-
cism, and that international enforcement authority is relatively weak. See, e.g., Krasner, “Sharing
Sovereignty,”pp. 111-113, and Ilias Bantekas,“Natural Resource Revenue Sharing Schemes (Trust Funds)
in International Law,” Netherlands International Law Review 52, pp. 31-56 (2005). At the time of writing, the
Chad government had announced its intention to substantially weaken the revenue management frame-
work in order to gain greater discretionary power over oil revenues, and recent reports have stated that graft
and mismanagement within the Chad government have brought the program to the verge of collapse. See
Oxfam USA, “Crisis in Chad’s Oil Revenue Management,” Reuters Foundation AlertNet, 17 November
2005, http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/fromthefield/255952/113226774343.htm (downloaded 5 December
2005); Lydia Polgreen and Celia W. Dugger,“Chad’s Oil Riches, Meant for Poor, Are Diverted,” New York
Times, 18 February 2006. However, the flawed nature of the Chad program does not reflect on the concept
of shared sovereignty per se but rather on (a) the necessity of designing adequate international oversight
mechanisms and (b) the particular difficulties of engaging effectively with highly corrupt governments.
32) International Crisis Group,“Liberia and Sierra Leone: Rebuilding Failed States,”Africa Report No. 87,
December 2004.
33) Krasner,“Sharing Sovereignty,”pp. 113-118.
34) See, e.g., Larry Diamond,“Building Democracy after Conflict: Lessons from Iraq,” Journal of Democracy
16:1 (January 2005), p. 17.
35) Judy Batt and Dov Lynch,“What Is a ‘Failing State’and When Is It a Security Threat?,”background paper
presented to the seminar on Failing States and the EU’s Security Agenda, EU Institute for Security Studies,
8 November 2004.
36) Ottaway and Mair, pp. 1-3.
37) For example, Ottaway and Mair use the example of Sierra Leone to argue that small, well-equipped,
and well-trained deployments of international security forces (ideally under the supervision of a lead
nation, such as the United Kingdom in this case) can prevent the escalation of conflict and establish a level
of stability that enables recovery and reconstruction to take place (Ottaway and Mair, pp. 4-5).
38) Ottaway and Mair, pp. 4-6.
39) See, e.g., Ian S. Spears, “Debating Secession and the Recognition of New States in Africa,” African
Security Review 13:2 (2004), pp. 41-43; Jeffrey Herbst, States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in
Authority and Control (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), p. 266.
40) See, e.g., Mohammed Ayoob,“State Making, State Breaking, and State Failure,” in Turbulent Peace: The
Challenges of Managing International Conflict, ed. Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall
(Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2001), pp. 127-142.
41) See Spears, pp. 39-41; Herbst, pp. 266-269; Ottaway and Mair, p. 7.
42) See Spears, p. 39; The Economist, “Somaliland: The Nation Nobody Knows,” 12 April 2001; The
Economist,“Somaliland: Trying to Behave Like a Proper State,”29 September 2005; Jean-Jacques Cornish,
“AU Supports Somali Split,”Mail & Guardian Online, 10 February 2006.
43) On the estimated economic costs of state failure, including spillover costs to neighboring states, see Lisa
Chauvet and Paul Collier,“Policy Turnarounds in Failing States,”April 2005, pp. http://www.cgdev.org/doc/
event%20docs/MADS/Chauvet%20and%20Collier%20-%20Policy%20Turnarounds%20in%20
Failing%20States.pdf (downloaded 15 December 2005)
44) A useful overview of the development of African regional and subregional security capabilities is pro-
vided in Tanja Schümer,“Evidence and Analysis: African Regional and Subregional Governmental Capacity
for Conflict Management,” Paper prepared for the U.K. Commission for Africa, 19 September 2004,
http://www.commissionforafrica.org/english/report/background/schumer_background.pdf (downloaded
15 December 2005). See also Victoria K. Holt with Moira K. Shanahan,“African Capacity-building for Peace
Operations: UN Collaboration with the African Union and ECOWAS,”Henry L. Stimson Center, February
2005, http://www.stimson.org/pub.cfm?id=243 (downloaded 15 December 2005).
45) Peacebuilding Commission Draft Resolution, 18 November 2005, p. 2. See also Security Council
Resolution 1645 (2005), 20 December 2005, p. 2.
46) These programs include the European Union’s African Peace Facility, the United States’ African
Contingency Operations Training and Assistance program, and the U.K.’s Africa Conflict Prevention Pool.
47) See Herbst, pp. 263-264.
48) Dutch Directorate-General for International Cooperation, pp. 16-17.
49) For a useful discussion of the potential offered by regional peace-building conferences, see George
Zachariah,“Regional Framework for State Reconstruction in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,”Journal
of International Affairs 58:1 (Fall 2004), pp. 215-236.
50) See Vince Crawley, “Multinational Exercise Aims to Improve Post-conflict Teamwork,”
http://usinfo.state.gov/sa/Archive/2006/Feb/14-526947.html; Pamela Hess, “Experiment to Test Crisis
Planning,”United Press International, 13 February 2006.

C·A·P
Center for Applied Policy
Research © 2006
Maria-Theresia-Str. 21
81675 München
Telefon 089 · 2180 1300
Telefax 089 · 2180 1320
E-Mail redaktion@cap-lmu.de
www.cap.lmu.de
